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'THE GENERATIONS OF ANTS AND BEAVERS': CLASSICAL 
ECONOMICS AND ANIMALS IN THE MILL ON THE FLOSS 
By Andrew Lallier 
Before any named characters find their way into The Mill on the Floss, the narrator introduces 
us to two sets of animals (aside from a human driver): white ducks dipping their heads into the 
stream and horses pulling a covered wagon. The ducks are characterized as being 'unmindful 
of the awkward appearance they make in the drier world above' (24). This characterization 
serves a comic purpose, indicating a disparity between the mentality of the unreflective animals 
and the implicit judgement of the narrator's gaze. By contrast, the horses seem to possess a 
surprisingly developed interiority (however conditioned by the narrator's 'fancy'), as we hear 
of the 'mild reproach' they feel for the driver's unnecessary whipping and their energetic 
exertion at being 'so near home'. The horses' very bodies are endowed with interior attributes, 
from their 'struggling haunches' to their necks possessing 'patient strength'. These horses even 
take precedence over their driver: while the driver is thinking of his dinner, he will first feed 
his horses, and the narrator anticipates the horses neighing 'over their hardly earned feed of 
corn', but leaves the driver's dinner 'getting sadly dry in the oven'. The implication that the 
horses are in the laborious process of earning their feed figures them as economic beings, 
driven by the same motivations that drive their driver. In this paper, I will argue that George 
Eliot's use of animals in this text, both with reference to motivation and more generally in 
connecting human and animal realms, presents a challenge to the conceptions of animals and 
the distinctions drawn between animals and humans in classical economics. 
Although critics have shown significant interest in economics and animals in relation 
to George Eliot, there has been as of yet no major attempt to relate these two fields. Elsie 
Michie's 'Horses and Sexual/Social Dominance' probably comes closest to such an attempt, 
relating horses in Eliot, Gaskell and Hardy to social class - and more particularly discussing 
the disruptive appearance of members of the 'newly enriched' commercial classes on 
horseback. Works by J. Hillis Miller on rhetoric and animals in Mill, and by Beryl Gray and 
Rosemary Ashton on Natural History in Mill are of particular interest with respect to this paper 
and will be returned to later.! I follow the work of critics like Deanna Kreisel and Kathleen 
Blake in reading economic import both in the overt content (like Bob Jaken's shipping, Mr 
Tulliver's bankruptcy) and the less obvious content (Maggie's romantic plots, narrative 
digressions about education). I will also be taking as a starting assumption Dermot Coleman's 
argument that Eliot was highly knowledgeable of and engaged in the conflicts of classical 
economics, both from direct familiarity with the works of political economists as well as 
through her work with The Westminster Review.' Before turning to Eliot's engagement with 
animals in The Mill on the Floss, I want to sketch out a brief account of animals in classical 
economics, as an important background for understanding this engagement. 
In the second chapter of the first book of An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith speaks of a 'certain propensity in human nature ... to truck, 
barter, and exchange one thing for another' which is 'common to all men, and [is] to be found 
in no other race of animals' (20). This peculiar propensity in turn brings about the division of 
labour, and thus permits the emergence of a distinctive human economy and engenders a 
progressive tendency in this economy to increase production. The distinction of the human 
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from other animals is nothing new - the move certainly precedes Aristotle's political (or 
rational) animal and Plato's jesting non-distinction of the featherless biped - but it takes on a 
particular importance in the development of political economy in Britain. If political economy 
were to draw no fundamental distinction between the human and other animals and at the same 
time the laws of political economy were to govern collective human behaviour, then a troubling 
implication would be that there were no significant and practically manifest difference between 
the human and other animals. Because humans possess a differentiating propensity to engage 
in the formative economic activity of trade, which may, Smith speculates, in turn be derived 
from human faculties of speech and reason, we can put confidence in the general project of 
political economy as something which will ultimately accord with human needs and 
aspirations. At the same time, this differentiation seems to devalue animals: Smith calls cattle 
and poultry 'unmanufactured commodities', while even animals that contribute labour are at 
most 'instruments of husbandry' (179, 73). Although the second chapter considers dogs as 
animals that can engage us emotionally, more attention is given to animals considered as 
instruments, and far more attention to animals treated as commodities - particularly cattle (the 
most frequently referenced animal in Wealth of Nations), poultry and swine, as well as game 
and animals hunted for fur. This economic understanding of animals is shared by Ricardo, who 
treats them primarily as a kind of embodied exchange value in his On the Principles of Political 
Economy and Taxation. 
Smith is not, however, entirely consistent in differentiating between humans as rational 
economic agents and animals as commodities. Smith compares 'the uniform, constant and 
uninterrupted effort of every man' to better his condition with 'the unknown principle of animal 
life,' both apparently related to a 'natural progress of things towards improvement' (114). A 
similar triple connection occurs in agriculture where 'labouring servants', 'labouring cattle' 
and nature itself labour together - although, perhaps tellingly, only the farmer who hires this 
labour is described as putting it to work (135). At least in one major respect, human populations 
seem to behave like animal populations: 'As men, like all other animals, naturally multiply in 
proportion to the means of their subsistence, food is always, more or less, in demand' (218).3 
Exactly how close Smith is here to Malthus's infamous position not entirely clear - his 
often optimistic tone suggests distance, but Smith does not here spell out what it is that keeps 
human popu1ations in line with their subsistence. In the opening chapter of his Essay on the 
Principle of Population, Malthus is careful to draw a more careful distinction than Smith on 
this point: 'in plants and irrational animals' population dynamics are 'simple', increasing until 
checked by 'want of nourishment'. Humans are also powerfully driven by a powerful drive but 
may also listen to reason, which encourages them not to increase beyond their available supply. 
Although following reason 'too frequently results in vice', the results of not doing so are 
human misery and death (Malthus I, 3). Despite this opening gesture towards an exceptional 
human rationality, this rationality seems incapable of changing the human population's animal-
like tendency to increase beyond its means of sustenance (although a great number of other 
mediate checks precede the ultimate check of want of food in limiting human populations). 
Although Malthus insists that humans have available to them something beyond the 'dictates 
of nature' given to animals and can act 'as reasonable beings', it is not at all clear that this 
availability modifies their behaviour. 
As Mill seeks to recover a more holistic conception of political economy from Smith, 
he also seems to inherit Smith's interest in animals, as well as some of Malthus's anxiety about 
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population. In Mill's Principles of Political Economy with some of their Applications to Social 
Philosophy, animals do function as commodities (again, particularly cattle), but they also play 
a crucial role in labour and the 'domestication of the more useful animals' serves to distinguish 
the first major step in human civilization (I, 33, 12): Like Malthus, Mill is quick to insist that 
the human possesses motivations beyond 'mere animal instinct', but Mill seems more sanguine 
concerning the possible efficacy of these motivations than his predecessor (191). Combating 
what he sees as a tendency to view poverty as inevitable according to the laws of political 
economy (a view easily adduced from the work of Malthus and Ricardo), Mill counters: 
'Poverty, like most social evils, exists because men follow their brute instincts without due 
consideration .... But society is possible, precisely because man is not necessarily a brute. 
Civilization in every one of its aspect is a struggle against the animal instincts' (445-6). This 
struggle against the animal or brute instincts marks the essential 'step out of the merely animal 
state into the human' (334). This step is not, however, irreversible. Hypothesizing a state in 
which all economic checks to population were removed, Mill declares that support of the poor 
would come to take up the entire production of a country, at which moment the population 
checks of 'death or prudence' would 'come into operation suddenly and at once; everything 
which places mankind above a nest of ants or a colony of beavers, having perished in the 
interval' (434). 
In the transition from political economy to economics that developed in the second half 
of the nineteenth century, Mill's attempt at a holistic model would be replaced by a 
systematically and mathematically grounded model, shaped by impulses more akin to those 
guiding Ricardo's work (though discarding the labour theory of value advocated by both 
Ricardo and Mill). As political economy develops an increasingly abstracted and mathematical 
character, it becomes ever more necessary to secure a core of predictable rationality in 
humanity that will govern its behaviour and conform to a given set of laws. At the same time, 
the manifest anxieties concerning the distinctions between the human and the animal found in 
Malthus and Smith seem to disappear from view. In his Theory of Political Economy, William 
Stanley Jevons does draw a distinction between the human and the animal, designating 'the 
lower wants' as common to both 'man' and 'brutes,' while reserving a sphere of secondary 
desires for the human (50-1); but this distinction does not appear, as Smith's propensity for 
trade, at the foundational beginning of the text - and it seems to require no particular 
elaboration as regards animals. As in Ricardo, the animals that appear in Jevons's work are 
few in number and primarily present as food to be bought and sold. 
Although George Eliot would not meet Jevons until well after The Mill on the Floss 
was published, she was directly familiar with the works of both Smith and Mill, and served as 
editor to the Westminster Review in midst of the journal's long tradition of the defence of 
classical economics and more particularly as the legacies of Ricardo's thought were being 
developed (Coleman, 23-8). As Catherine Gallagher notes, her acquaintance with Malthus's 
ideas is only enigmatically attested to in her journal, but is apparent from her earliest fiction 
(174-5). In this context, Eliot's extensive references to animals in a novel centrally concerned 
with economic activity and status can be read as a commentary of sorts on the development of 
political economy. Eliot's attention to working animals such as horses and dogs, and her 
interest in their subjective interiorities, bespeaks a challenge to the tendency in political 
economy to reduce animals to commodities.' However, in this paper, I will be focusing 
primarily on the instinctual, animal-like economic behaviour of characters in the novel and 
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narratorial challenges to human/animal distinctions, particularly on the level of societies or 
populations. 6 In attacking the kinds of distinctions political economists drew between the 
human and the animal, Eliot is in part realizing the anxieties of Mill and Malthus, and 
recognizing the limits of civilized rationality. But we might also think of Eliot as resisting the 
Ricardian impulse to render political economy an abstract and mathematically-reducible 
systematic undertaking, and as taking Mill's Smithian project of a more holistic political 
economy further than either Mill or Smith could.' 
Tom Tulliver and Bob Jakin present the reader with two opposed narratives of personal 
economic development and animals, which illustrate the dangers of an excessive abstraction of 
the human from the animal. Both boys begin the story with an intense, often antagonistic and 
sometimes deadly, relationship with the animals around them. Bob has a relatively complex 
view of animals, seeing them variously as prey for economic gain (being involved in bird 
frightening and interested in rat-catching), potential helpers in economic activity (ferrets and 
dogs) and sources of entertainment. Although Tom shares this last view, his primary 
understanding of animals is as economic status symbols - seeing his father's 'capital black 
mare - as pretty a bit of horse-flesh as ever you saw' as proof of his standing and dreaming of 
becoming a young gentleman with the natural 'accoutrements' of horses and dogs (60-2, 136, 
187,217). As Tom advances in trade, he seems to abandon this previous interest in animals, a 
development that coincides with his increasing suppression of impulses and instincts irrelevant 
to business. Bob meanwhile gives up his dreams of rat-catching, but successfully sublimates 
his animal desire to hunt animals into his profession as a packman, continuing his 'sport' with 
'haggling women' and seeing Mrs Glegg as 'a bit of game worth running down' (267-8, 295). 
Bob also maintains other animal connections, following Maggie with the 'gaze of an intelligent 
dumb animal', and maintaining a close personal and economic relation to his dog Mumps 
(229).8 While Bob manages to maintain strong connections both to business and his emotional 
domestic life (being also a good Malthusian and waiting to get a wife until his monetary 
situation warrants doing so), Tom's economic development seems to entail deprivation of 
personal and emotional connections. 
In discussing Tom and Maggie, the narrator seems to posit animal impulse as a stage 
humans outgrow: 'We learn to restrain ourselves as we get older .... We no longer approximate 
in our behaviour to the mere impulsiveness of the lower animals, but conduct ourselves in 
every respect like members of a highly civilized society' (52). However, the lengthiest 
comparisons of humans and animals in this novel are directed at the unequivocal adults Mrs 
Tulliver and Mr Stelling, and an animal-like 'mere impulsiveness' seems to govern the social 
and economic behaviour of the inhabitants of St Oggs. Like Tom as a shrewmouse or Bob as 
intelligent dumb beast, most characters in this novel get by, particularly their economic actions, 
without any apparent surplus of reflection or comprehensiori. 
We might think of Mrs Tulliver and Wakem as representing different ends of this 
instinctual-animal spectrum. Mrs Tulliver is compared to 'a patriarchal gold-fish' on account 
of her apparent imperviousness to experience (85) - an imperviousness which causes her 
inadvertently to encourage her husband to damage her family's economic situation by paying 
back a loan from Mrs Glegg. Later imagined as a hen in the chapter 'How a Hen Takes to 
Strategem', Mrs Tulliver attempts reflection, but without any better result: 'Imagine a truly 
respectable and amiable hen ... taking to reflection and inventing combinations by which she 
might prevail on Hodge not to wring her neck, or send her chicks to market: the result could 
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hardly be other than much cackling and fluttering' (234). Unlike the hen, however, Mrs Tulliver 
actually manages to bring about a misfortune on her family not previously contemplated by her 
oppressor. If Mrs Tulliver's instinctual unreflectiveness acts to her economic disadvantage, 
Wakem seems possessed of animal instinct much better fitted to economic benefit. Wakem is 
not stymied by the kind of conflicts that paralyze characters like Maggie and Dr Kenn, but 
instead possesses 'motives [that] run in fixed tracks' (239). Although Wakem is certainly 
rational, his economic activity is figured in animal terms, early on being 'sure of his game' and 
after the meeting with Mrs Tulliver being compared to a pike (157, 239). Taking Mr Tulliver 
as a roach and Wakem as a pike, the narrator remarks that the 'roach naturally abhors the mode 
in which the pike gets his living, and the pike is likely to think nothing further of even the most 
indignant roach than that he is excellent good eating' (239-40). The two senses of 'gets his 
living' coalesce here, and Wakem's economic activity is imagined as a kind of animal 
devouring of persons and property.' Although Wakem has rational reasons for his acquisition, 
it is not at all clear that he is not rationalizing a motive that is based more in resentment than 
calculation. Wakem's pleased contemplation of humiliating Tulliver and his desire 'to 
predominate over' Guest and Deane suggest that for Wakem, no less than Tulliver, 
'predominance' may form an animal 'law of life' which directs and determines his economic 
and social behaviour (241, 192). 
Although the most overt specimen of animal instinct among the Dodsons and Tullivers, 
Mr Tulliver is hardly alone as a creature whose instincts affect him economically. Mr Tulliver's 
instinct to go 'lawing' is given no rationale except the above-mentioned need to predominate 
(and presumably a correspondent sensitiveness to perceived threats to this need) and Wakem's 
characterization of him as a 'furious bull' seems confirmed by Tulliver's animal response to 
Wakem, once freed from his economic bonds to the lawyer. 10 That the Dodson sisters and their 
husbands are more successful than the unfortunate Bessy and Edward seems to be less a 
function of some rational surplus than a different set of animal instincts or habits." Mr Glegg 
accumulates his wealth slowly, 'as the tracking of the fox belongs to the harrier' and following 
'the inalienable habit of saving' (p. 127). Mrs Glegg seems guided by a similar drive to saving 
and thrift, as exploited by Bob and resulting in a wide range of behaviour satirically described 
by the narrator in her as well as her sisters. Once engaged in talking about professional 
advancement, Mr Deane easily detaches himself from the particular circumstances before him 
(e.g., Tom's wanting a job) in indulging a 'tendency to repress youthful hopes' and an instinct 
to reminisce (220-1). 
The best known junction of instinct and profession is embodied in Mr Stelling's 
beaver-like approach to education, which, like Mr Deane's discourse, proceeds with a 
'uniformity of method and independence of circumstances' (140). As J. Hillis Miller has 
thoroughly analyzed the metaphoric acrobatics Mr Stelling's educational method sets off in the 
narrator, and Rosemary Ashton has analyzed the scientific analogy at work in Mr Stelling's 
comparison with Binny the beaver, I will content myself with noting that Mr Stelling engages 
in teaching Tom grammar and Euclid with the 'same unerring instinct of the beaver' and taking 
note of some of the narrator's comments shortly after the famous passage analyzed by Miller 
(Miller, 61-8; Ashton, 32-33; Eliot, 143) Mr Stelling's discourse is guided by an animal-like 
instinct, but is itself primarily devoid of animals, consisting in grammar and logical 
mathematics - the animals Miller takes up, the beaver, the camel and the shrewmouse are all 
imposed by the narrator. Tom, by contrast, identifies Latin as 'beastly stuff' (143). Although 
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Tom's complaint does not appear to refer consciously to animals, before taking a plunge into 
metaphorical fields, stomachs, and paper the narrator defends Tom's practical and animal 
knowledge (particularly of dogs and horses) against Stelling's more abstract claims (142). We 
might here also think of Maggie's despairing inability to connect Aldrich's logic with the 
'living world' around her, including its animal inhabitants (p. 270). In place of Mr Stelling's 
instinctual belief in Latin for its own sake, the narrator imagines another basis for the language, 
speaking of Tom's unawareness that there were once 'people who bought and sold sheep and 
oxen, and transacted the everyday affairs of life, through the medium of this language'. The 
narrator mayor may not share a hypothetical Tom's suspicion about the need to learn Latin 
'when its connection with those affairs had become entirely latent', but it is clear that the 
narrator is interested in unearthing a historical basis for the language in human economic 
activity, and connecting this activity to animals (143). 
The image of animals at market is invoked in quite a different context by Mr Tulliver 
towards the beginning of the novel, when he reflects with mild lament that Maggie's 
intelligence makes her 'no better nor a long-tailed sheep - she'll fetch none the bigger price for 
that' (28). A similar anxiety surfaces once Maggie has acquired qualities more desirable on the 
marriage market (a submissive 'good' -ness and an attractive appearance) that she will 'be 
thrown away' due to her loss of economic status. Philip attributes a similar attitude concerning 
animal fitness in match-making to his fellow citizens, objecting to his Father: 'Find a single 
person in St Ogg's who will not tell you that a beautiful creature like her would be throwing 
herself away on a pitiable object like me' (392). Philip's hypothesis seems confirmed by the 
reaction of St Ogg's to Maggie before her elopement. In this light, Stephen Guest's decision to 
pursue Maggie can be seen not solely as a passionate violation of social norms (as we are 
encouraged to think of it), but as a recognition of certain values already established in a wider 
market, proceeding in the violation of some customs. The narrator describes Stephen's self-
appeal to avoid Maggie with a reference to his half-engagement to Lucy, 'the dearest little 
creature in the world', and the narrator explicitly confirms Stephen's judgement that Lucy 
would make a good wife with reference to Lucy's kindness to her domestic animals (352, 342). 
But Maggie is also figured as a desirable creature: 'To see such a creature subdued by love for 
one would be a lot worth having - to another man' (377). While ineffectively concealing 
personal desire, Stephen's appeal to 'another man' affirms the social market value Maggie 
holds as an animal to be possessed. Maggie's appeal to an incalculable value inherent in the 
moral debts we hold to other humans can be thought of as a kind of resistance, not only to a 
logic that would reduce human relations to abstract economic relations, but also to the 
economical calculus of passion proposed by Stephen. 
We should not forget that Maggie herself is a story-teller in this narrative, and extends 
humanlike sociality and behaviour to the insects around her, creating worlds in which spider 
families bicker over how best to serve their flies and earwigs go in search of the doctor when 
injuries befall their children (43, 105). The scientifically-minded narrator may not share 
Maggie's wide speculations, but does imagine the town of St Oggs itself 'as a continuation and 
outgrowth of nature, as much as the nests of the bower-birds or the winding galleries of the 
white ants' (121). For a novel that manifests an interest in connecting humans, animals and 
economics, there would have hardly been a more compelling animal to choose at this point in 
the nineteenth-century than ants. In 1853 eighth volume of the eighth edition of the 
Encyclopcedia Britannica, much attention is given to the 'economy and domestic policy of 
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these remarkable creatures' (III. 261). Ants, by this account, possess a labour force and army, 
draw from a variety of food supplies (including milking domesticated aphids), construct 
elaborate dwelling spaces and some species even participate in a 'slave trade' (262-6). Many 
of these same features of ants would later be referenced by Darwin in The Descent of Man as 
an argument against man being placed in a separate kingdom from the animals (147). 
Throughout the Mill, the narrator offers several possible distinctions between humans 
and animals, none of which seem to do the kind of work desired by the distinctions of political 
economists. Maggie is described as 'gifted with that superior power of misery which 
distinguishes the human being, and places him at a proud distance from the most melancholy 
chimpanzee' (59). Misery, however, is precisely the alternative to vice that results when human 
populations behave like animal populations and exceed their food supply, according to 
Malthus. A more positive distinction is later offered in that 'striving after something better and 
better in our surroundings, the grand characteristic that distinguishes man from the brute' (154). 
Despite the optimistic Smithian tone of this distinction, the narrator immediately undermines 
this tone by rendering this a distinction made within humanity with imperial overtones, and 
then placing greater value in an emotional attachment to the world in which we grow up. 
Finally, the narrator offers up Bob's thumb as a 'specimen of that difference between the man 
and the monkey' (267). The 'proud distance' between the human and the animals rests not in 
some rational surplus or tendency to improvement or civilization, but in a simple fluke of 
physiology. 
Discarding the distinctions of political economy, The Mill on the Floss alternates 
between Maggie's speculative joy and interest in animals and their connections with our world, 
economic and otherwise, and a narrative anxiety about our animal-like unreflective behaviour, 
which can threaten economic well-being, but also threatens us with the prospect that our 
society produces nothing more than the' generations of ants and beavers' (256). It is consistent, 
however, in its expression of a need to include animals in the literary and economic stories we 
tell, and its suspicion of any abstract logical or mathematical narrative that would claim to 
describe human society while effacing both positive and negative aspects of our animal 
irrationality and the roles that animals play in our cultures and imagination. 
Notes 
For more work on Eliot and animals, see Gray's 'George Eliot, George Henry Lewes, 
and Dogs', The George Eliot Review 33 (2002), pp. 51-63; Brenda Ayers-Ricker, 
'Dogs in George Eliot's Adam Bede', George Eliot - George Henry Lewes Newsletter 
18-19 (Sept 1991), pp. 22-30; Mary Jean Corbett, "The Crossing 0' Breeds" in The 
Mill on the Floss' in Victorian Animal Dreams: Representations of Animals in Victorian 
Literature and Culture, eds Deborah Morse and Martin Danahay (Aldershot, U K: 
Ashgate, 2007), pp. 121-144; Shifra Hochberg, 'Animals in Daniel Deronda: 
Representation, Darwinian Discourse, and the Politics of Gender', George Eliot -
George Henry Lewes Studies 30-31 (Sept 1996), pp. 1-19; and Linda K. Robertson, 
'Horses and Hounds: The Importance of Animals in The Mill on the Floss', The George 
Eliot Review 26 (1995), pp. 61-3. 
2 Work has also been done connecting Eliot's novels to the work of particular classical 
economists, particularly Smith and Malthus. For some examples of this work, see Rae 
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Greiner's 'Sympathy Time: Adam Smith, George Eliot and the Realist Novel', 
Narrative 17.3 (Oct 2009), pp. 291-311; Imraan Coovadia, 'George Eliot's Realism 
and Adam Smith', SEL: Studies in English Literature 1500-190042.4 (Autumn 2002), 
pp. 819-835; Catherine Gallagher's chapter on Eliot in The Body Economic (referenced 
in the Bibliography) and Lana Dalley's 'The Economics of "A Bit 0' Victual", or 
Malthus and Mothers in Adam Bede', Victorian Literature and Culture 36 (2008), pp. 
549-567. 
3 For a reading of Smith's somewhat different account of animals in his Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, see Alejandra Mancilla's 'Nonhuman Animals in Adam Smith's Moral 
Theory', Between the Species 9 (August 2009), <http://cla.calpoly.edu/bts/>. 
4 Mill even goes so far as to argue that the protection of the 'lower animals' from cruelty 
falls within the proper scope of government, by analogy with the protection of children 
(ll, p. 546). 
5 Beryl Gray has drawn particular attention to the developed interiorities of dogs in this 
novel- see 'Animated', 145. 
6 Many of the passages I cite in the rest of this paper have been previously cited by critics 
like Beryl Gray and Linda K. Robertson (among others). In returning to these passages, 
however, I wish to emphasize the hitherto neglected economic dimensions at work in 
these animal figurations and comparisons. 
7 For a discussion of the development of political economy from Smith to Jevons that 
traces these competing impulses towards holism and mathematical system, see Claudia 
C. Klaver's NMoral Economics: Classical Political Economy and Cultural Authority 
in Nineteenth-Century England (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2003). 
8 Although this requires some hypothesizing, I would argue that Mumps most probably 
serves as a kind of guard dog for Bob, besides being an emotional companion. 
9 As Beryl Gray points out, this metaphor of eating (and the threat of choking) is also 
used by Wakem himself in talking about Tom (,Animated', 154). 
10 On the point of the novel's presentation of Mr Tulliver's instinct or impulse to go 
'lawing', see Law, p. 58. 
11 For an extensive account of habit in this text, see Kristie M. AlIen's 'Habit in George 
Eliot's The Mill on the Floss', SEL 50.4 (Autumn 2010), pp. 831-852. 
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